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Abstract 
This paper tests the widespread belief that right-wing governments tend to promote 
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economies than in more developed countries. Moreover, the analysis of the broad dimensions of 
economic freedom indicates that right-wing governments tend to act by improving monetary 
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1. Introduction 
There is a common believe that ideologies shape policy debates and choices. A fundamental 
premise for this is that right-wing parties defend a decentralized economy funded on economic 
freedom and on the protection of property rights, while left-wing parties tend to the diverge from 
this scenario. This gave rise to an abundancy of studies analyzing partisan preferences over 
macroeconomic variables with some degree of success in capturing distinctions between right and 
left ruling (see, for instance, Alesina et al., 1997; Franzese, 2002). However, hovering above the 
realm of the macroeconomy, we come across the notion of economic freedom that, in general, stands 
for the degree to which an economy is a market economy. This landscape in which economic agents 
operate is shaped by policy decisions and existing institutions. 
In today’s democracies, political debates and voters’ perceptions align significantly with the 
idea that selecting between right or left governments is a choice between socialism and unrestrained 
free markets. The idea of partisan preferences over economic freedom has been consolidated by, for 
example, Margaret Thatcher’s and Ronald Reagan’s strong support to the concept of free markets. 
In a more recent case, the expansion in the size and scope of the government under the Obama 
administration – which included new regulations in areas like finance, health care, and the 
environment –  pushed the United States to its lowest economic freedom score ever in 2017. 
However, under the Trump administration, America’s economic freedom has seen a substantial 
boost linked to several policy changes that include tax cuts and deregulation. Nevertheless, there are 
also historical examples that contradict the traditional left-right positioning over market freedom. 
For instance, Tony Blair’s “New Labour” (1997-2007) defended limitations to government 
involvement in the markets and was open to the idea that the state should not own major industries. 
Yet the empirical question remains: Do right-wing parties, when in office, actually promote and 
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guarantee economic freedom, while left-wing governments are more moderate on this matter? And 
if so, in which of the major dimensions of economic freedom is ideology relevant? These are 
important questions, not only from the perspective of the democratic functioning of societies, but 
also for those studying policy decision making. Additionally, answering these questions is critical 
for understanding the actual contribution of modern political parties to the organization of 
contemporary societies, allowing us to assess if the longstanding theoretical debate between free 
markets and interventionism is indeed reflected in real policy choices. 
The main goal of this paper is to provide an empirical answer to these interesting research 
questions. Some clues can be found in the existing literature, but the number of papers on the subject 
is scarce and centered at the sub‐national level. The present paper goes beyond the strict examination 
of developed economies and resorts to an extended timeframe of annual data in the empirical 
analysis. To accomplish the task at hand, annual data are collected for 106 countries over the period 
1975-2015 and adequate panel data techniques are used to assess the role of ideology. In addition, 
it tests other political and economic features such as the relevance of time in office, majority 
governments and the impact of financial crisis. As a measure for the many aspects of economic 
freedom, we rely on the aggregate Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index computed by the 
Fraser Institute and on the five broad areas that compose it. 
This study shows that left-wing governments do not affect economic freedom, unless they 
are populists. In that case, economic freedom is significantly undermined during their tenure in 
office. However, right-wing governments clearly conform to the expectations: they are indeed more 
prone to promote economic freedom and to deregulate the economy. This effect is found to be 
relatively stronger in their first term in office and in developing/emerging economies than in more 
developed countries. Furthermore, right-wing governments tend to stimulate economic freedom 
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levels mainly through monetary soundness, international trade and by easing regulations that restrict 
entry into markets. In addition, other factors have also proved to play a relevant role in the economic 
freedom dynamics observed over the last decades. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the link between ideology 
and economic freedom; Section 3 describes the data, variables, and methodology. The empirical 
analysis and discussion of the results are presented in Section 4. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
2. Economic Freedom and government ideology 
The traditional partisan hypothesis depicts right-wing parties as strong believers in the 
importance of free markets and leftist parties as advocates of market control and state intervention. 
Consequently, it is expected that countries with a prevalence of right-wing governments improve 
their levels of economic freedom. Although the right/left cleavage is still very much present in 
today’s political agendas and debates, modern researchers point out that theory and practice may be 
difficult to align. This is largely due to limitations to economic policy imposed by the current legal 
and institutional framework (see Acemoglu et al. 2005), rising global competition, and electoral 
concerns (Nordhaus 1975). As such, the capability and willingness of governments to implement a 
full array of ideological policies may be diminishing. Structural reforms play an important role in 
the functioning of markets and in the implementation of ideologically based policies. Several 
perspectives are proposed to explain what prompts them (see de Haan and Parlevliet, 2018). 
The idea put forward by Rodrik (1996) that recessions are important triggers of major policy 
changes has been confirmed empirically in works by Pitlik and Wirth (2003) and Drazen and 
Easterly (2001). There is also the suggestion that institutional constraints limiting executive action 
tend to restrict the execution of major policy changes, however most papers find no empirical 
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support for this hypothesis (see, for example, Pitlik and Wirth, 2003). Additionally, reforms may be 
instigated by a process of policy diffusion across countries, where international policy trends tend 
to drive local reforms. Employing five-year time spans over the period 1970-2000 for 23 OECD 
economies, Pitlik (2007) finds that economic policy reforms are influenced by processes of policy 
diffusion and that market-oriented governments promote economic liberalization. 
There is a prevalent belief that governments tend to dislike reforms that exhibit short-term 
costs, particularly near elections. Opportunism and the electoral cycle should, therefore, lead to 
fewer reforms. Nevertheless, newly elected governments may be more inclined to policy changes 
given the distance to the next elections (Alesina et al., 2006) and given the expectations of change 
they generate on the electorate. Reforms are also expected to be more easily implementable in the 
context of majority governments. In this paper, we test the importance of these political aspects for 
economic freedom. We can postulate that if there is a strong policy diffusion along with a global 
trend reinforcing market liberalization, then the majority context and newly elected governments 
might end up increasing economic freedom. However, one could argue that the presence of left-
wing governments, traditionally adverse to unrestrained free markets, can offset this linkage. 
Some authors have begun to explicitly study the importance of economic conditions for party 
competition with a special focus on globalization constrains to state intervention and on the 
ideological convergence of mainstream parties (see, for example, Ward et al., 2011). The overall 
international environmental changes over the last decades have increased the difficulties 
governments have in implementing ideological agendas, particularly when it comes to left 
governments trying to carry out fewer liberal policies and simultaneously to capture the median 
voter. On the one hand, the international trend towards globalization fosters transnational 
competition, economic integration, and capital mobility, which poses obstacles for policies aimed 
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at market control. One the other hand, there is a widespread believe that economic freedom seems 
to benefit economic prosperity, a policy outcome much appreciated by voters. Gwartney and Lawson 
(2002) point out that countries in the bottom 20% of the economic freedom index have had negative 
growth, while the upper 20% have grown significantly faster than other countries. Additionally, the 
causality running from economic freedom to income/growth is reasonably well established (see de 
Haan et al., 2006). As such, the difficulties faced by electorally constrained left governments, makes 
us to assume a weaker version of the previous hypothesis, i.e. that the majority context and newly 
elected governments are, at least, not expected to reduce economic freedom. 
The potential barriers to the implementation of the left’s agenda are a reason to suspect that, 
in recent decades, many leftist governments may be unable or unwilling to reduce economic 
freedom; however, it is not anticipated that they promote it. The constrains work as incentives when 
thinking of right-wing governments engaging in active pro-market policies. The empirical literature 
generally recognizes that ideology impacts economic freedom and has emphasized the positive 
effect of right-wing governments. Focusing on the Canadian provinces, Bjornskov and Potrafke 
(2012) report that ideology affects labour market regulation. In a similar analysis for the US States, 
Bjornskov and Potrafke (2013) find further evidence for the impact of ideology on the labour 
markets, as Republican governors are found to promote deregulation. Furthermore, using a 
regression discontinuity approach, Hankins and Hoover (2019) find that Democratic governors in 
the US do not reduce economic freedom when compared to Republican governors elected by a 
similar margin. Examining the German States, Potrafke (2013) shows that right-wing governments 
tend to increase economic freedom. However, this evidence was confined to the West German 
States. Considering a broader group of European Union member states over the period 2000-2012, 
Jäger (2017) reports that left-wing governments are significantly more likely to restrict economic 
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freedom than right-wing governments. In a more recent work, Murphy (2019) uses the Botero et al. 
(2004) measure of government ideology to predict the EFW index for the years 1995 and 2015. 
Results also support the dominant view that conservative parties improve economic freedom. 
This study goes beyond the strict examination of a country’s states or developed economies 
and resorts to an extended timeframe of annual data. In addition, it also looks at the impact of 
ideology on the five broad areas of economic freedom. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this section, we present the data describing the variables and respective sources and 
provide some descriptive statistics. Then we introduce the methodological approach and the model 
to be used in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.1 Data 
To assess the role of the political ideology on economic freedom, we gather annual data for 
a panel of 106 countries over the period 1975-2015.1 Countries were selected according to the 
availability of economic and political data. This means that we consider only those countries for 
which there are: (i) economic freedom data for at least a period of five years; (ii) reasonably long 
series for the main political and socio-economic control variables; (iii) regular/frequent and 
competitive elections; and (iv) changes in the political orientation of the government over the time 
period considered in this study. 
The Economic Freedom index (EconFreedom) computed by the Fraser Institute is our 
dependent variable. According to the Economic Freedom of the World 2017 Annual Report 
 
1 The list of countries is provided below in Table 1. 
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(Gwartney et al., 2017), this index measures the degree to which countries’ policies and institutions 
are supportive of economic freedom. This index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating 
a higher level of economic freedom. The main features that define economic freedom are personal 
choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and compete, and security of the person and 
of privately owned property. 2  The dataset comprises information for 159 countries, available 
annually from 2000 to 2015 and for years ending in zero or five back to 1970. The data are available 
for approximately 100 countries back to 1980. The Fraser Institute uses 42 data points to construct 
this index (for further details, see Gwartney et al., 2017); it also uses them to measure the degree of 
economic freedom in five broad areas: Size of Government (SizeGov), Legal System and Property 
Rights (LegalSystem), Sound Money (SoundMoney), Freedom to Trade Internationally 
(FreedomTrade), and Regulation (Regulation).3 
This study aims at assessing the impact of political orientation not only on the overall level 
of economic freedom but also on each of these more specific areas. To control for this effect, we 
construct three dummies relying on the EXECRLC variable from the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI): Right, Centre, and Left. 4  These dummies take the value of one when the 
government if formed by right-wing, centre, or left-wing parties, respectively, and 0 otherwise.5 
 
2 Gwartney et al. (2017, p.1) stress that “individuals are economically free when they are permitted to choose for 
themselves and engage in voluntary transactions as long as they do not harm the person or property of others. […] 
economically free individuals will be permitted to decide for themselves rather than having options imposed on them by 
the political process or the use of violence, theft, or fraud by others.” 
3 See Table A.1 in Annex for a more detailed description of these five components. 
4 The DPI divides parties into three groups based on an evaluation of a party’s orientation with respect to economic 
policy (Cruz et al., 2016). For single party majority governments, the indictor variable corresponding to its ideology 
takes the value one in years during which the party rules a given country. For coalition governments, the DPI classifies 
a coalition government as having the ideology of the largest coalition partner. The group of right-wing parties includes 
conservative, Christian democratic, and other right-wing parties; the group of left-wing parties includes communist, 
socialist, social democratic, and other left-wing parties; and the group of Centre includes parties defined as centrists or 
which party position can best be described as centrist. 
5 As a robustness check we will also use data from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) to derive an alternative 
variable for Right. In this case, we consider a right government when the variable GOV_PARTY in CPDS is equal to 1 
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Looking at the data presented in Figure 1, we observe that the Economic Freedom index is, 
on average, higher when right-wing parties are in office, both for the period in which the Fraser 
Institute publishes annual data (2000-2015) and for the period in which DPI data are available (1975-
2015). Plotting the relationship between the Economic Freedom index and the dummy Right, we 
observe the same positive association (see Figure 2). The linear regression between these two 
variables stresses the statistical significance of this relationship. 6  A recent and paradigmatic 
example of a right-wing government promoting economic freedom (and a left-wing one not) is the 
US. In the George W. Bush era (2001-2008), the economic freedom index reached an average of 
8.3, but during the Barak Obama presidency (2009-2016) it decreased to 7.8. 
This initial analysis is very simplistic, hence a more complete specification and proper 
methodologies are needed to assess the significance of this association. Nevertheless, these 
preliminary findings are in line with the common understanding that right-wing governments tend 
to deliver more economic freedom than left-wing ones. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
In order to build an encompassing framework of relevant factors for economic freedom, 
other variables are added to the model. Some additional political variables – also retrieved from the 
DPI over the period 1975-2015 – are used to account for the role of the political environment: 
 
or 2 (see Armingeon et al., 2017). The five ideological categories in GOV_PARTY will also be individually analysed. 
Despite the longer time period (1960-2016), the number of countries for which it is possible to gather political data from 
this dataset is restricted to: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
6 For example, for the period 2000-2015, the observed t-statistic for the coefficient on Right is higher than the 5% critical 
value, i.e. tobserved=0.47439/0.0495=9.58>1.96=tcritical,5%. Hence, the respective estimated coefficient is positive and 
highly significant. 
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- Political cycles in economic freedom are controlled for using a dummy that takes the value 
of one in the election years (Election), and 0 otherwise. 
- Political support is another dimension explored. We use another dummy that takes the value 
of one when the government has a majority in the parliament (MajGov), and 0 otherwise. 
- In addition, we will also assess whether the time a party is in office (TimeOffice) – and 
respective political orientation – influences the level of economic freedom or not. 
- The quality of democracy has been considered in the related literature as one of the 
conditionings of economic freedom. 7  Following this literature we use the Democracy 
variable which corresponds to the “polity2” variable in the POLITY IV database (see 
Marshall et al., 2017); this measures how democratic a country is in a scale ranging from -10 
(strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic); we anticipate a positive relationship 
between the quality of democracy and economic freedom. 
Following a few studies in the field, we also consider a set of additional socio-economic 
controllers in our model: 
- The level of income is usually associated with economic freedom; while the causality running 
from economic freedom to income/growth is reasonably well established (de Haan and Sturm, 
2000, 2001; de Haan et al., 2006), the opposite is less clear (Farr et al.,1998; Vega-Gordilla 
and Álvarez -Arce, 2003; Aixalá and Fabro, 2009); we use the real gross domestic product 
per capita (GDPpc) obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset to account 
for the income effect on economic freedom; its five-year average is used to address the any 
endogeneity issues; we expect GDP per capita to have a positive effect on economic freedom. 
 
7 See, for example, de Haan and Sturm (2003), Lundström (2005); Lipford and Yandle (2015), Krieger and Meierrieks 
(2016) and Islam (2018). 
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- Trade openness is another economic factor that can affect economic freedom; countries that 
are more open to trade are expected to be associated with higher levels of economic freedom; 
to account for this effect we add to the model the variable Trade computed as exports plus 
imports as a percentage of GDP and obtained from the WDI.8 
- Crises are another factor that has been identified as having a negative effect on economic 
freedom (de Haan et al., 2009; Stocker, 2016; Murphy and Smith, 2017); a dummy that takes 
the value of one when a financial crises occur is used to account for this effect; financial crises 
are identified following the works by Laeven and Valencia (2018) and Nguyen et al. (2020). 
- Finally, some studies show that the level of education is positively associated with economic 
freedom (Apergis et al., 2014; Crowley et al., 2017); to account for this effect, we use the 
Education Index from the 2016 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2016) and expect the 
same positive relationship; this is consistent with the argument by Caplan (2001) and Caplan 
and Miller (2010) that higher levels of education yield more liberal economic beliefs. 
As a summary, Table 1 presents the list of variables, respective definitions, descriptive 
statistics, sources, and list of countries used in this study.9 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The basic statistical analysis provided above in Figures 1 and 2 and the descriptive statistics 
reported in Table 1 cover two time periods: 2000-2015 and 1975-2015. The reason for this choice 
 
8 This measure, somehow, also reflects the size of a nation as small countries usually have a high trade-to-GDP ratio. 
Alternatively, we also run some experiments with the KOF globalization index (see Dreher, 2006 and Gygli et al., 2019). 
Despite the loss some observations/countries when this index is used, the results have proven to be qualitatively and 
quantitatively identical. Hence, our preference for the standard trade openness measure. These additional results are not 
reported here but are available upon request. 
9 Table A.2 in Annex presents the correlations between all variables. 
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relies on the data available from the Fraser Institute for the Economic Freedom index and respective 
areas: annual data are provided for the period 2000-2015, but before 2000 data are available only 
for years ending in zero or five back to 1970. This creates a problem of missing values and might 
restrict the econometric analysis to the 2000-2015 period or even the loss of more observations in 
case a five-year time span estimation is considered. To overcome this problem, we use King et al. 
(2001) multiple imputation method to generate the missing data for the period 1970-2000.10 
As imputation techniques are open to critiques, for obvious reasons, our strategy will always 
be to compare the results for the period in which we have annual data for economic freedom (2000-
2015) with the ones obtained with the larger sample where (annual) missing values for economic 
freedom (and respective areas) are generated through the multiple imputation procedure. The 
following dynamic panel data specification is considered in the estimation for both time periods: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜸𝜸𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜹𝜹𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑷𝑷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑅𝑅 = 1, … ,106 and 𝑡𝑡 = 2000, … ,2015 or 𝑡𝑡 = 1975, … ,2015 (when imputation is allowed 
for). 11 The coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable (𝜌𝜌) measures its persistence. The 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽 captures the impact of a right-wing government on economic freedom, while the 
vectors 𝜸𝜸  and 𝜹𝜹  assess the effect of the political (Pol) and socio-economic (SocEco) factors 
described above; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents unobserved country-specific effects, while 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 captures time-effects 
 
10 Following the authors’ recommendations, we impute five values for each missing observation and create five complete 
series for economic freedom and respective areas. Across these series the observed values are the same, but the missing 
values are filled in with different imputations to reflect uncertainty levels. Then, for estimations over the period 1975-
2015, we regress the model five times using the five series. The estimates reported for each coefficient are the average 
of the five separate estimates; the respective standard error is obtained by computing the square root of the average of 
the estimated variances from each individual estimate plus the sample variance in the point estimates across the five 
estimates, multiplied by a factor that corrects for the bias. For further details, see King et al. (2001, p.53). 
11 A similar specification is employed in the estimations for the five areas of economic freedom, where EconFreedom 
is successively replaced by GovSize, LegalSystem, SoundMoney, FreedomTrade, and Regulation. 
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like global shocks, institutional and socio-economic changes or technological progress no accounted 
for in our set of variables;12 finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the usual error term. 
Given the presence of individual effects, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, the model can be estimated assuming those 
effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent variable would be correlated 
with the error term even if the latter is not serially correlated. This implies that OLS estimates 
(random or fixed effects) will be biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2013). The estimators that take 
into account that bias can be grouped into: (i) bias-corrected estimators, best suited when the number 
of individuals (N) is small and the number of time periods (T) is not very large; and (ii) instrumental 
variables estimators, more adequate when there is a clear dominance of cross sections (N) over time 
periods (T) and with the additional feature of tackling the potential endogeneity of other variables 
by using internal instruments. In our panel structure, although T is not large (in particular, when we 
use the sample 2000-2015), the number of individuals cannot be considered small (N=106). As such, 
we resort to the class of estimators known as GMM (generalized method of moments) estimators, 
first proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to solve the bias problem, thus allowing for a more 
consistent and efficient way of estimating dynamic models. While the GMM approach yields 
consistent estimators, the original difference-GMM estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) may suffer from finite sample biases. These biases arise 
particularly when time series are persistent. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) recommend additional moment conditions, since – as long as they are valid – they increase 
the efficiency of the estimators. This estimator is known as the system-GMM estimator and allows 
 
12 Given the relatively high number of time periods (and to avoid the proliferation of instruments in the estimator we 
employ in the empirical analysis), these time effects are captured by including a trend in the specification. 
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for higher accuracy and reduced finite sample bias (Bond, 2002; Baltagi, 2013).13 Our model is 
estimated by system-GMM with a two-step approach. To avoid over-fitting biases, instruments are 
collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2009a, b). Moreover, equally to avoid the proliferation of 
instruments, we treat only the lag of the dependent variable (EconFreedom or its areas) and 
Democracy as endogenous; as for other potential endogenous variables, like GDPpc, Trade and 
Education, we use their five-year averages – instead of simply their lagged values – to mitigate the 
problem of reverse causality and treat them as exogenous. 14 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section starts with the discussion of the general results from the estimation of the model 
to the period 2000-2015. Then we move to a closer analysis of the ideological effects and broad 
areas of economic freedom. Finally, relying on the imputation techniques described above, the 
analysis is extended to the period 1975-2015. 
 
4.1 Initial findings 
Table 2 reports the results from the system-GMM estimations for the economic freedom 
specification over the period 2000-2015. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for 
finite samples (Windmeijer, 2005) are reported in parenthesis and the respective significance level 
is indicated with asterisks. The number of observations, countries, instruments, p-values for the 
 
13 For this to be valid, the system-GMM requires the stationarity of the variables and the lack of correlation between the 
first differences of the instruments and the specific effects (Baltagi, 2013). ADF Fisher-type panel unit root tests were 
performed for the dependent and independent variables used in this study. The results are presented in Annex (see Table 
A.3) and show that the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots is rejected for all the variables that we use in 
our regressions. 
14 The lag of EconFreedom and Democracy are instrumented with their lags in the first-difference and level equations 
while the exogenous variables are instrumented with their own values. 
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serial correlation, Hansen, and Difference-in-Hansen tests are reported at the bottom of the Table 2. 
These tests support the dynamic specification employed and the validity of the instruments used. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
The results are clear and robust in showing that economic freedom, over the period 2000-
2015, is significantly higher when right-wing parties are in office relative to other governments 
(centre and left- or simply left-wing governments – see columns 1 and 2). Looking at the results in 
the baseline specification in column 1, we observe that the Economic Freedom index is on average 
around 0.05 points higher with right-wing governments, ceteris paribus. This is the short-run effect; 
in the long run, the impact is higher: 0.28 (=0.05/(1-0.82)). This means that right-wing governments 
contribute to a 0.28 points increase in economic freedom in the long-run. Hence, when in office, 
those parties do what they are expected to do in terms of promoting economic freedom. This finding 
is in line with the results found by Pitlik (2007), Potrafke (2013) and Jager (2017). On the contrary, 
no statistically relevant effect is found when left-wing parties are in office (see column 3). 
Regarding the political and socioeconomic controllers, we find no significant effect on 
economic freedom from Election, MajGov or even TimeOffice. As to the quality of democracy 
(Democracy), there is some weak evidence that better democracy is positively associated with higher 
economic freedom, as some studies suggest (see footnote 7).15 In regression 2, we add the dummy 
Centre to the model, but its coefficient is statistically insignificant, so we can keep it in the base 
category with Left. In regression 4, we interact Right with MajGov to assess whether right-wing 
governments with majority are more prone to promote more economic freedom, but the differences 
in political support are found to be irrelevant. Most likely coalition governments lead by right parties 
 
15 We also considered the machine learning democracy index proposed by Gründler and Krieger (2016) as an alternative 
proxy for the quality of democracy. Despite the number of observations being reduced in that experiment, the findings 
were quite similar. Those results are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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are, in most cases, formed with other right-wing parties. A similar conclusion is reached when 
TimeOffice is interacted with Right (column 5). Time in office does not seem to undermine the 
intensification of economic freedom undertaken by right-wing governments. However, we observe 
that after a regime change, the level of economic freedom increases significantly during the first 
term in office of a right-wing government (RightTerm=1) – see column 6 – with the magnitude and 
significance of the effect decreasing slightly thereafter (RightTerm>1). Nevertheless, the important 
positive impact of right-wing governments on economic freedom does not fade away and remains 
relevant throughout all its time in office, which is in line with what we observe in regression 5. 
Focusing now on the socio-economic factors, the logarithm of the five-year average of real 
GDP per capita (LnGDPpc) was the only variable that proved not to have a statistically significant 
coefficient.16 As expected, more openness to trade, absence of financial crises and more educated 
population are beneficial for economic freedom. 
 
4.2 Closer analysis of the ideological effects 
This section analyses two important aspects regarding the effect of ideology. On the one 
hand, it investigates potential differences between the groups of developed and developing/emerging 
countries. On the other hand, it refines the traditional, but simplistic, right-left divide for government 
orientation. This more detailed analysis addresses the concern that the world is not just “right”, “left” 
or “centre”, by accounting for some important nuances observed in real-world politics. We examine 
two particular aspects. The first is whether a government is fully constituted by right (left) parties 
 
16 This variable is obtained from the averaged of the previous five years. We use the logarithm to compress the scale of 
measure; this also allows the interpretation of the results in terms of semi-elasticity. We have also tried the lagged log 
of real GDP per capita and the lagged values (and five-year averages) of real GDP growth but none resulted in a 
statistically significant coefficient for these variables (the other results remained qualitatively and quantitatively 
unchanged). Those results are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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or if the dominant right (left) ruling party simply leads a coalition with others from different 
quadrants. Hegemonic governments are expected to be in better conditions to execute their agendas. 
The second aspect tackles a growing phenomenon in modern democracies: the emergence 
of populist governments. Relying on Kyle and Gultchin’s (2018) identification of populists in office, 
we create the dummies PopRight and PopLeft identifying right and left populist governments, 
respectively. The other governments are considered to be established right-wing (EstabRight) or 
left-wing (EstabLeft) governments. 
Populism is a loose label that comprises a variety of movements with specific motivations 
and agendas (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). The political evolution of the last decades has made 
the classification of parties in the left-right spectrum increasingly difficult. The emergence and 
success of populism reinforces the notion that parties and voters exhibit multidimensional political 
attitudes and preferences. Laméris et. al. (2018) validate four relevant dimensions: economic 
equality; markets and efficiency; personal and cultural freedom; and nationalist, protectionist and 
populist preferences. Labeling populist parties as left- or right-wing is admissible, however it is 
more subjective than placing traditional parties. For instance, when it comes to maintaining the 
welfare state, several populist parties, that are right-wing in other respects, are against reforms like 
left-wing parties. Moreover, some populist right-wing parties can be pro-market but defend some 
degree of economic protectionism. Hence, when using the left-right divide in the case of populist 
parties, we must be aware of the particularities that arise from this classification. Nevertheless, 
populist governments generally share a strong resistance to foreign influence and tend to exert more 
control over the society. As such, it is admissible to find left-wing populist governments more 
proactive in reducing economic freedom than their more moderate counterparts. The expected effect 
of right-wing populist governments is less clear. The traditional right-wing tendency towards free 
18 
 
markets can clash with the resistance to outside influences and with the “us versus them” speech 
these parties usually have. Hence, we expect them to provide a smaller boost to economic freedom 
than mainstream right-wing governments. How much smaller or whether there is a detrimental effect 
are questions best answered empirically. 
The results of this empirical analysis are reported in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.17 They 
show that economic freedom increases substantially with established (or non-populist) right-wing 
governments. However, no distinctive effect can be attributed to the populist right (see column 1). 
Overall, we can conclude that right-wing governments – especially mainstream ones – promote more 
economic freedom than any other type of government. 
On the contrary, while economic freedom is not significantly affected by well-established 
left-wing governments (EstabLeft), populist ones (PopLeft) undermine economic freedom 
significantly (see column 2). Even though the overall negative effect of Left (see column 3 in Table 
2) is not significant, when we separate the mainstream left from the populist one, we find that 
economic freedom decreases by about 0.09 points when the latter are in office. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
Regarding the potential differences between hegemonic and non-hegemonic governments 
we constructed four dummies, relying on the GOV_PARTY variable provided by the CPDS 
database: hegemony of right parties (HegRight); dominance of right parties (DomRight); hegemony 
of left parties (HegLeft); and dominance of left parties (DomLeft). Those are included in regressions 
3 and 4, which show that economic freedom benefits more from governments with hegemony of 
right-wing parties, while it is mainly undermined when left-wing parties in office are dominant but 
 
17 The estimations reported in Table 3 include the same set of political and socio-economic controllers used in the 
regressions reported in Table 2. The results for those controllers have proven to be very similar as well as the results of 
the GMM tests. They are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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not hegemonic.18 We conjecture that the emergence of this unexpected effect for the left may relate 
to the possibility that mainstream left governments tend to ally themselves with extreme left parties, 
typically more prone to implement ideological based policies. Again, despite accounting for 
alternative “shades of right and left”, we end up concluding that right-wing governments do more 
for economic freedom than any other party.19 
The second part of Table 3 (columns 5-6) assesses any potential differences between the 
groups of developed and developing/emerging countries using the DPI dataset again. In column 5, 
the model is extended with the inclusion of a dummy for OECD and its interaction term with Right. 
There is some evidence that, on average, economic freedom is higher in the subgroup of OECD 
countries. However, no significant ideological effects are found with this divide. 
In regression 6, we use Mousseau’s (2012) Contract Intensive Economy (CIE) index as an 
alternative measure of development. The CIE ranges from 0.12 and 8.74 and measures the level of 
development of countries, in the sense that those more market-developed tend to be more contract-
intensive, i.e. where most citizens regularly obtain goods and services contracting with strangers 
located in a market. The results show that countries with a higher level of contract-intensity (i.e. 
more developed markets) tend to exhibit a higher level of economic freedom, but this effect tends 
to be significantly dampened in these same markets when right-wing parties are in office. This 
suggests that the effect of government ideology (Right) is stronger in developing/emerging countries 
 
18 Even though the government orientation effect remains similar to the one obtained with political data from the DPI 
database, the sample used here is different: the CPDS database comprises only 34 developed countries. For that same 
reason, the estimator used in regressions 3 and 4 is different. As the number of individuals is low and the number of 
time periods is not large, Bruno’s (2005a, b) LSDVC estimator for dynamic panel data models is more adequate to deal 
with this panel structure. The Blundell-Bond procedure is used as the initial estimator in the LSDVC estimations; 100 
repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors were undertaken. 
19 Note that the some of the estimated coefficients for HegRight and DomRight is positive and statistically significant. 
A similar conclusion is reached if we use a simple dummy for Right (HegRight+DomRight) in the model. The results 
are not reported here but they are available upon request. 
20 
 
than in more developed ones.20 This result can somehow be linked to the convergence hypothesis: 
the theory predicts faster growth for economies that have not reached their steady-state value yet 
(Solow, 1956; Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1996). This might be what is happening here as 
governments in developing/emerging countries have more margin to improve economic freedom 
than in more developed markets (where higher levels have already been reached). In fact, over the 
period 2000-2015 the average of the Economic Freedom index was 7.5 in the group of more 
developed OECD countries and 6.5 in the developing/emerging economies. 
 
4.3 The effect of right-wing governments on the main areas of economic freedom 
The results found so far establish a robust link between right governments and economic 
freedom. Now it is important to assess which areas of economic freedom are improved under their 
ruling. Table 4 presents results for the five areas of economic freedom over the period 2000-2015. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
Looking at the estimated coefficients on the dummy Right across all the regressions, it seems 
that right-wing governments do not tend to promote economic freedom in all five categories. In 
areas such as the size of government and the legal framework they do not behave differently from 
other parties. However, right-wing governments improve monetary soundness and price stability. In 
fact, according to the partisan business cycles literature (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987; Alesina and 
Sachs, 1988) they are more concerned with inflation than left-wing governments. Therefore, their 
efforts to promote price stability end up intensifying economic freedom in the area of sound money. 
Additionally, our results also show them as more prone to boost freedom to trade internationally and 
to ease regulations that restrict entry into markets or limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labor, 
 
20 Nevertheless, this result should be analysed with some care as the estimations are limited to the period 2000-2012 
when CIE is included in the model. 
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or product markets. In particular, this evidence for Regulation corroborates the claim in the literature 
that right-wing governments are more prone to deregulate the economy (Potrafke, 2010; Bjørnskov 
and Potrafke, 2012, 2013; Aidt et al., 2018).21 
Regarding the political and socio-economic controllers, a better democratic environment 
helps to boost the role of the legal system and rule of law; the results for output per capita are mixed: 
higher levels of income per capita reduce economic freedom in the area of government size, maybe 
because government size is positively related to GDP per capita; but higher real GDPpc tend to be 
linked to the promotion of the rule of law and consequently more freedom in this area. Trade 
openness and education exhibit a similar result, but both are also positively associated with more 
freedom to trade internationally and regulation. Finally, financial crises have proved to be a very 
harmful event for all areas of economic freedom. 
 
4.4 Imputation approach 
The above results hold for the period 2000-2015, for which the Fraser Institute provides 
annual data. In this section, we extend the analysis to the period 1975-2015. To generate the missing 
data for the period 1970-2000, we employ King et al. (2001) multiple imputation method.22 Tables 
5 and 6 report, respectively, the results for the Economic Freedom index and for the respective broad 
areas. Overall, they confirm our previous findings but there are a few specificities in this analysis 
that is worth to notice. First, with the exception of regressions 2 and 4 in Table 5, the estimated 
coefficients are the averages of the coefficients obtained from five imputations of the index and the 
 
21 Similar regressions were conducted replacing the dummy Right by a dummy for left-wing governments, however this 
variable was found to be statistically insignificant across all five categories. To keep the analysis parsimonious, those 
results are not reported here but they are available upon request. 
22 Note that we end up using data for the period 1975-2015 because DPI only reports political data from 1975 onwards. 
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standard errors are obtained following King et al. (2001).23 Regressions 2 and 4 retrieve estimates 
where the average of the five imputed series is used as dependent variable. Whether we use King et 
al. (2001) approach to compute the estimates or the average of the five EconFreedom imputed series 
as dependent variable, the results remain essentially the same (compare columns 1-2 and 3-4). 
We started by estimating our baseline model with education in the list of regressors. 
However, since data for this variable are restricted to the period 1990-2015 (with some missing 
values for some countries), the number of observations is only slightly higher than when we rely on 
the 2000-2015 period. Hence, this does not add much to the previous analysis, confirming the 
importance of education for economic freedom. For the sake of increasing the time span, we 
removed Education from the list of regressors in the subsequent estimations (see regressions 3 and 
4, in particular). The results for the other variables do not vary much, with the exception of LnGDPpc 
and Trend. The first becomes relevant and uncovers the importance of real GDP per capita to 
promote economic freedom; the coefficient on the trend variable also becomes highly significant, 
which, in part, might be collecting the effect that increasing education levels might have had over 
time on improving economic freedom.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
Most importantly, with or without education, with or without imputation, the results 
reinforce the idea that right-wing governments are more prone to increase economic freedom than 
centre or left-wing ones (even when data from CPDS database is used instead – see column 6).24 
 
23 We follow King et al. (2001, p.53) to compute the coefficients and standard errors; the p-values presented at the 
bottom of Tables 5 and 6 are also obtained as the average of the p-values from the individual estimations where each of 
the five imputed series is used. These provide a gross approximation of the true p-values. In fact, they are not very 
different from the cases where average of the imputed series is used instead as dependent variable (regressions 2 and 4). 
24 Note that the estimator used in regression 6 is different. As the number of individuals is low and the number of time 
periods is large (41 years), the FE estimator becomes adequate: it converges as T increases. The dummy Right, in this 
particular case, corresponds to the sum of the dummies HegRight and DomRight (as described above). Additional 
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This suggests that partisan effects over economic freedom seem to exist not just in this century but 
also when we add the final three decades of the 20th century, revealing the significant temporal 
consistency of the phenomenon. 
Looking at the estimations for the five broad areas presented in Table 6, results are well in 
line with those reported in Table 4 and discussed above in sub-section 4.3. Now real GDP per capita 
gains some (positive) relevance in other areas of economic freedom, but without compromising the 
importance of political orientation for SoundMoney, FreedomTrade and Regulation. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
As a final exercise – and to overcome the limitations of multiple imputation techniques in 
generating values for the missing observations – the baseline model was estimated using five-year 
time spans and legislative term spans over the period 1975-2015. Although there is a significant loss 
of information (available in annual data), the results using a two-step system GMM estimator 
corroborate our previous findings, as can be observed in Table A.4 and A.5 reported in Annex 
(EconFreedom: columns 1-3; respective areas: columns 4-8).25 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This study provides a clearer picture on the role of ideology in shaping the economic 
environment by putting to the test the rooted conception that right-wing governments tend to steer 
a society into a free market economy while left governments navigate in the opposite direction. For 
this purpose, we use annual data for 106 countries over the period 1975-2015 and the Economic 
 
estimations with the FE estimator were also performed with the entire sample of 106 countries but the main conclusions 
remained essentially unchanged. Those results are not reported here but they are available upon request. 
25 As in the estimations above, LnGDPpc, Trade and Education are averages over the previous 5 years spans (Table 
A.4) or legislative period (Table A.5). Now FinCrisis corresponds to the fraction of time a country is in crisis over the 
previous five years (A.4) or legislative period (A.5). Democracy is instrumented with either its five-year average (A.4) 
or legislative period (A.5) average. The other political variables correspond to their contemporaneous values as before. 
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Freedom index computed by Fraser Institute. A two-step system GMM estimator is employed and 
several samples are tested. To better understand where exactly ideology is relevant in shaping the 
economic environment, we also take a closer look at the five major areas of economic freedom. 
Overall, the results strongly suggest that ideology affects the background in which economic 
agents operate, stressing the idea that when voters are deciding between electing a right- or a left-
wing government, they are deciding – among other things – whether they want more or less 
economic freedom. We found that right-wing parties, when in office, actually do what they are 
expected to do: they promote economic freedom. The reported effect is almost twice as strong in 
developing/emerging economies than in more developed countries. However, left-wing 
governments do not seem to undermine economic freedom as expected by voters and political 
theorists, except when the populist left is in office. In these cases, economic freedom is substantially 
reduced during their tenure. The results provided in this paper are robust to the time period 
considered, estimation procedure and across different areas of economic freedom. Also, partisan 
effects seem to exist not just in this century but also when we add the final three decades of the 20th 
century, through data imputation techniques, revealing that the phenomenon has a significant 
temporal consistency. 
However, not all areas of economic freedom are found to exhibit partisan effects. The size 
of government and the legal framework seem to be unaffected by the incumbent’s ideology. Right 
wing parties tend to promote economic freedom by easing regulations that restrict entry into markets 
or limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labor, or product markets, thus encouraging a laissez fair 
laissez passer environment in the economy. They also increase monetary soundness, promoting 
price stability and low inflation, a trait consensually attributed to right parties. Results also show 
25 
 
that they are more prone to boost freedom to trade internationally, being capable to deliver better 
conditions for their residents to engage in voluntary exchanges with people in other countries. 
Other potentially relevant political aspects such as the time spent in office and majority 
governments do not seem to be important for the explanation of economic freedom, even when we 
restrict their effects to periods when the right is in power. Yet, right-wing governments seem to have 
a stronger positive effect on economic freedom in their first term in office. 
Finally, other factors like the quality of democracy, level of income per capita, trade 
openness, financial crises and the level of education have also proved to be important to explain the 
changes in the level of the Economic Freedom index over the last decades. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Description of the variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max 
EconFreedom Economic Freedom index; it measures the degree 
to which the policies and institutions of countries 
are supportive of economic freedom; it is also 
disaggregated into five broad areas: 
1652 
[2816] 
6.81 
[6.62] 
0.91 
[0.95] 
2.92 
[1.60] 
8.86 
[9.05] 
SizeGov   Size of government 1652 [2816] 6.39 [6.06] 1.32 [1.36] 2.36 [0.64] 9.49 [10.0] 
LegalSystem   Legal system and property rights 1652 [2816] 5.40 [5.52] 1.71 [1.62] 2.01 [0.99] 9.14 [9.14] 
SoundMoney   Sound money 1652 [2816] 8.15 [7.83] 1.54 [1.56] 0.00 [0.00] 9.89 [9.89] 
FreedomTrade   Freedom to trade internationally 1652 [2816] 7.25 [7.03] 1.10 [1.24] 2.06 [0.00] 9.49 [10.0] 
Regulation   Regulation 1652 [2816] 6.86 [6.72] 0.98 [0.98] 2.36 [1.61] 9.12 [9.12] 
Right Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when a 
right-wing party is in office; and 0, otherwise. 
1678 
[3426] 
0.26 
[0.31] 
0.44 
[0.46] 
0 
[0] 
1 
[1] 
Centre Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when a 
centre-wing party is in office; and 0, otherwise. 
1678 
[3426] 
0.08 
[0.09] 
0.27 
[0.29] 
0 
[0] 
1 
[1] 
Election Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 in the 
year of legislative elections; and 0, otherwise. 
1684 
[3458] 
0.25 
[0.24] 
0.43 
[0.43] 
0 
[0] 
1 
[1] 
MajGov Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when 
the party in office has a majority in the 
parliament; and 0, otherwise. 
1667 
[3369] 
0.77 
[0.78] 
0.42 
0.41 
0 
[0] 
1 
[1] 
TimeOffice Number of years a party is in office. 1527 
[3161] 
9.16 
[9.25] 
10.54 
10.92 
1 
[1] 
71 
[71] 
Democracy Autocracy-Democracy index for quality of 
democracy; it describes how democratic a 
country is in a scale ranging from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). 
1669 
[3436] 
6.56 
[6.06] 
4.27 
[5.05] 
-7 
[-9] 
10 
[10] 
GDPpc Real gross domestic product per capita (base 
year: 2010; US$). 
1683 
[3462] 
15172 
[14194] 
20166 
[17922] 
219.19 
[170.58] 
111968 
[111968] 
Trade Trade openness: exports plus imports as a 
percentage of GDP. 
1681 
[3431] 
85.25 
[77.26] 
51.17 
[50.27] 
19.80 
[9.10] 
441.60 
[441.60] 
FinCrisis Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when a 
financial crisis is occurring; and 0, otherwise. 
1685 
[3566] 
0.30 
[0.33] 
0.46 
[0.47] 
0 
[0] 
1 
[1] 
Education Education index computed using mean years of 
schooling and expected years of schooling. 
1672 
[2585] 
0.64 
[0.61] 
0.18 
[0.18] 
0.12 
[0.09] 
1.00 
[1.00] 
Sources: Economic Freedom of the World (1970-2015), Fraser Institute (www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom) for the 
dependent variable and respective areas. Database of Political Institutions (1975-2015), World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org), and 
Comparative Political Data Set (1960-2016) for the political variables (http://www.cpds-data.org/). The quality of democracy index 
comes from the Polity IV project (1960-2016) database, Center for Systemic Peace (www.systemicpeace.org). For the economic 
variables, data were gathered from the World Development Indicators (1960-2016), World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org). Data 
for FinCrisis were obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2018) and Nguyen et al. (2020). The education index comes from the Human 
Development Reports (1990-2015), United Nations Development Programme (http://hdr.undp.org). 
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the 106 countries considered in the estimations over the periods 2000-2015 (without brackets) and 
1975-2015 (in square brackets). The countries used in the estimations are the following (OECD countries in italic): Albania, Algeria, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Table 2. The impact of government ideology on economic freedom (2000-2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.EconFreedom 0.8197*** 0.8217*** 0.8105*** 0.8202*** 0.8548*** 0.8586*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0528) (0.0556) (0.0511) (0.0438) (0.0441) 
Right 0.0469*** 0.0474***  0.0556** 0.0343**  
 (0.0167) (0.0175)  (0.0274) (0.0159)  
Centre  0.0025     
  (0.0292)     
Left   -0.0153    
   (0.0223)    
Election 0.0047 0.0044 0.0040 0.0049 0.0112 0.0105 
 (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0097) (0.00984) 
MajGov 0.0014 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0056 0.0070 0.0043 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0172) (0.0192) (0.0162) (0.0153) 
Maj×Right    -0.0110   
    (0.0274)   
TimeOffice     -0.0015  
     (0.0011)  
Office×Right     0.0003  
     (0.0012)  
RightTerm=1      0.0483*** 
      (0.0184) 
RightTerm>1      0.0263* 
      (0.0158) 
Democracy 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0009* 0.0009 0.0014* 0.0014* 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
LnGDPpc 0.0003 0.0005 0.0088 0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0005 
 (0.0231) (0.0236) 0.0251 (0.0230) (0.0209) (0.0201) 
Trade 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
FinCrisis -0.0735*** -0.0740*** -0.0771*** -0.0732*** -0.0675*** -0.0696*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0164) 
Education 0.4196*** 0.4083*** 0.4116*** 0.4176*** 0.2985** 0.3267*** 
 (0.1370) (0.1488) (0.1490) (0.1367) (0.1306) (0.1315) 
Trend -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
       
       
Observations 1478 1478 1478 1478 1360 1360 
Countries 106 106 106 106 101 101 
Instruments 95 96 95 96 97 96 
AR1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR2 0.7294 0.7335 0.7421 0.7255 0.0952 0.1012 
Hansen 0.2560 0.2333 0.2432 0.2706 0.3694 0.3873 
Diff-Hansen1 0.2391 0.2165 0.2607 0.2560 0.3555 0.3580 
Diff-Hansen2 0.5038 0.5107 0.2367 0.4750 0.4579 0.5989 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. Two-step system-GMM estimations using robust standard errors corrected 
for finite samples (standard errors in parentheses). Significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; 
and *, 10%. The lag of the dependent variable and Democracy are treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective 
lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation and their differences are 
used in the levels equation; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The values reported for 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first 
differences equations. The Hansen test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity; Diff-Hansen1 tests the 
exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff-Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the lagged 
level of economic freedom used as an instrument in the level part. RightTerm=1 (RightTerm>1) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for the first term (remaining terms) a right-wing government is in office; zero, otherwise. 
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Table 3. A closer look on the ideological effects on economic freedom (2000-2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.EconFreedom 0.8175*** 0.8051*** 0.7822*** 0.7801*** 0.8210*** 0.7256*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0570) (0.0307) (0.0313) (0.0482) (0.0649) 
EstabRight 0.0495***      
 (0.0184)      
PopRight 0.0260      
 (0.0321)      
EstabLeft  0.0018     
  (0.0243)     
PopLeft  -0.0869**     
  (0.0413)     
HegRight   0.0433***    
   (0.0155)    
DomRight   0.0222    
   (0.0174)    
HegLeft    -0.0334   
    (0.0213)   
DomLeft    -0.0518**   
    (0.0254)   
Right     0.0701** 0.1743** 
     (0.0315) (0.0763) 
OECD     0.0964**  
     (0.0433)  
OECD×Right     -0.0589  
     (0.0402)  
CIE      0.0582*** 
      (0.0212) 
CIE×Right      -0.0286** 
      (0.0132) 
       
       
Observations 1478 1478 507 507 1478 941 
Countries 106 106 34 34 106 105 
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 report two-step system-GMM estimations using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples 
(standard errors in parentheses); regressions 3 and 4 were performed using Bruno’s LSDVC estimator. Significance levels at which 
the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The lag of the dependent variable and Democracy are treated as 
endogenous in the GMM estimations as in the estimations in Table 2. The estimations include the same political and socio-economic 
controllers used in Table 2. The results for those controllers have proven to be very similar as well as the results of the GMM tests. 
They are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. The Blundell-Bond procedure is used as the initial 
estimator in the LSDVC estimations; 100 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors were undertaken. 
Regressions 3 and 4 use data from the CPDS database for government orientation. Separate estimations for non-OECD and OECD 
countries are reported in columns 6 and 7, respectively. Estab# (Pop#) correspond to dummies that take the value of one when an 
ideologically established (populist) right-wing or left-wing party is in office. Heg# (Dom#) correspond to dummies that take the 
value of one when there is hegemony (dominance) of right-wing or left-wing parties in office. OECD is a dummy that takes value 
of one when the country belongs to the OECD. CIE is the index of Contract Intensive Economy as defined by Mousseau (2012). 
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Table 4. Effects of government ideology on the broad areas of economic freedom (2000-2015) 
 SizeGov LegalSystem SoundMoney FreedomTrade Regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
L.DepVar 0.7854*** 0.6496*** 0.6936*** 0.7941*** 0.6322*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0625) (0.0948) (0.0451) (0.0663) 
Right 0.0053 0.0308 0.1327*** 0.0450** 0.0786** 
 (0.0407) (0.0561) (0.0482) (0.0218) (0.0372) 
Election -0.0144 0.0118 0.0143 0.0027 -0.0039 
 (0.0253) (0.0187) (0.0197) (0.0169) (0.0156) 
MajGov -0.0601 0.0371 0.0245 -0.0075 0.0434 
 (0.0377) (0.0509) (0.0461) (0.0249) (0.0322) 
Democracy -0.0018 0.0049*** 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0005 
 (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0011) 
LnGDPpc -0.1467*** 0.1924*** 0.0832 0.0125 0.0290 
 (0.0469) (0.0723) (0.0596) (0.0310) (0.0416) 
Trade 0.0002 0.0013** 0.0002 0.0012*** 0.0016*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
FinCrisis -0.0821** -0.0766* -0.1211** -0.0934*** -0.0893** 
 (0.0383) (0.0453) (0.0531) (0.0279) (0.0370) 
Education 0.4239 0.7999** 0.6062 0.4179* 0.7672** 
 (0.2870) (0.3491) (0.4118) (0.2208) (0.3302) 
Trend -0.0031 -0.0067* 0.0044 0.0042* 0.0050 
 (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0037) 
      
      
Observations 1478 1478 1478 1478 1478 
Countries 106 106 106 106 106 
Instruments 95 95 95 95 95 
AR1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR2 0.9472 0.3500 0.1498 0.1411 0.4242 
Hansen 0.2288 0.1411 0.2054 0.1449 0.1474 
Diff-Hansen1 0.1932 0.1126 0.1782 0.1284 0.1237 
Diff-Hansen2 0.8166 0.9028 0.6913 0.5803 0.7363 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. L.DepVar corresponds to the lag of the dependent variable for the 
respective area of economic freedom. Two-step system-GMM estimations using robust standard errors corrected for finite 
samples (standard errors are reported in parentheses); see Table 2 for technical details. 
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Table 5. The impact of government ideology on economic freedom (1975-2015) 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
L.EconFreedom 0.2301** 0.4088*** 0.1443** 0.2128*** 0.1609** 0.1490*** 
 (0.1162) (0.0643) (0.0737) (0.0553) (0.0699) (0.0521) 
Right 0.1426** 0.1248*** 0.1077** 0.0974*** 0.1335** 0.1437** 
 (0.0569) (0.0380) (0.0504) (0.0379) (0.0569) (0.0551) 
Election 0.0145 0.0168 0.0343 0.0357 0.0328 -0.0283 
 (0.0223) (0.0106) (0.0393) (0.0274) (0.0397) (0.0433) 
MajGov -0.0253 -0.0181 -0.0690 -0.0597 -0.0712 0.0529 
 (0.0486) (0.0309) (0.0491) (0.0365) (0.0477) (0.0558) 
Democracy -0.0008 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 0.0006 0.0408 
 (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.1022) 
LnGDPpc 0.1187* 0.0859* 0.2801*** 0.2587*** 0.2033*** 0.8545** 
 (0.0684) (0.0497) (0.0426) (0.0317) (0.0565) (0.3681) 
Trade 0.0022** 0.0016** 0.0027*** 0.0024*** 0.0032*** -0.0041 
 (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0121) 
FinCrisis -0.1769*** -0.1561*** -0.2531*** -0.2344*** -0.2528*** -0.1644** 
 (0.0610) (0.0402) (0.0816) (0.0515) (0.0797) (0.0733) 
Education 1.2503** 0.9717***     
 (0.5296) (0.3827)     
Trend 0.0010 -0.0008 0.0225*** 0.0208*** 0.0234*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0070) 
OECD     0.3073*  
     (0.1661)  
OECD×Right     -0.0459  
     (0.1225)  
       
       
Observations 1768 1768 2535 2535 2535 1053 
Countries 106 106 106 106 106 34 
Instruments 95 95 94 94 96  
AR1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
AR2 0.2506 0.6721 0.5158 0.3372 0.5308  
Hansen 0.3176 0.3902 0.2876 0.2807 0.3264  
Diff-Hansen1 0.3654 0.3997 0.3028 0.2673 0.3424  
Diff-Hansen2 0.2102 0.3048 0.2962 0.4639 0.2796  
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. The estimated coefficients, respective standard errors and additional 
statistics in columns 1, 3 and 5-6 were obtained from the estimation of five models using five imputations of EconFreedom; 
we follow King et al. (2001) to obtain the five imputations for the EconFreedom series and compute the estimates reported 
in this table as suggested by King et al. (2001, p. 53). The results in columns 2 and 4 were obtained from a single estimation 
where the average of the imputations of EconFreedom is used instead. Two-step system-GMM estimations using robust 
standard errors corrected for finite samples were employed for the estimation of models 1-5; for model 6 a panel FE estimator 
was used instead. Significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The lag of the 
dependent variable and Democracy are treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective lagged values and the 
other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation and their differences are used in the levels 
equation; they were collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The values reported for AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first 
differences equations. The Hansen test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity; Diff-Hansen1 tests 
the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff-Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the 
lagged level of economic freedom used as an instrument in the level part. Regression 6 uses data from the CPDS database 
for the variable Right (which is equal to HegRight plus DomRight). 
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Table 6. Effects of government ideology on the broad areas of economic freedom (1975-2015) 
 SizeGov LegalSystem SoundMoney FreedomTrade Regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
L.DepVar 0.0861* 0.0788* 0.1214** 0.1004* 0.1105** 
 (0.0506) (0.0434) (0.0619) (0.0554) (0.0504) 
Right 0.0548 0.0418 0.1789** 0.1386* 0.1433** 
 (0.1259) (0.0924) (0.0846) (0.0739) (0.0718) 
Election 0.0567 0.0291 0.0403 0.0230 0.0104 
 (0.0718) (0.0383) (0.0456) (0.0547) (0.0355) 
MajGov -0.1482 -0.0250 -0.0254 -0.1881** 0.0365 
 (0.1085) (0.0907) (0.1023) (0.0727) (0.0656) 
Democracy -0.0040 0.0070** -0.0009 0.0007 0.0004 
 (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0030) 
LnGDPpc -0.3403*** 0.7756*** 0.4393*** 0.3657*** 0.2512*** 
 (0.0754) (0.0733) (0.0608) (0.0410) (0.0426) 
Trade 0.0022 0.0023** 0.0012 0.0045*** 0.0041*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
FinCrisis -0.2022** -0.2330** -0.4062*** -0.2750** -0.2577*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0959) (0.1309) (0.1145) (0.0818) 
Trend 0.0227*** 0.0065 0.0417*** 0.0236*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0063) (0.0049) (0.0034) 
      
      
Observations 2535 2535 2535 2535 2535 
Countries 106 106 106 106 106 
Instruments 94 94 94 94 94 
AR1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AR2 0.5152 0.6536 0.5666 0.4218 0.4360 
Hansen 0.2434 0.2300 0.3124 0.3108 0.2922 
Diff-Hansen1 0.3060 0.2510 0.3494 0.2800 0.3030 
Diff-Hansen2 0.2256 0.3176 0.2948 0.6990 0.4082 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. L.DepVar corresponds to the lag of the dependent variable for the 
respective area of economic freedom. The estimated coefficients, respective standard errors and additional statistics were 
obtained from the estimation of five models using five imputations of each dependent variable; we follow King et al. (2001) 
to obtain the five imputations for each dependent variable series and compute the estimates reported in this table as suggested 
by King et al. (2001, p. 53). Two-step system-GMM estimations using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples 
were employed in the estimations; see Table 4 for technical details. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Average Economic Freedom index by Political Orientation of the Government 
Period: 2000-2015 Period: 1975-2015 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between political ideology and economic freedom 
Period: 2000-2015 Period: 1975-2015 
  
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses for each coefficient. 
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ANNEX 
 
Table A.1. Broad areas of Economic Freedom 
Area Description 
  
Size of government 
(SizeGov) 
As the size of the government increases, in terms of government spending, taxation, government-controlled 
enterprises, etc., centralized decision-making replaces individual choices and economic freedom is reduced; 
countries with smaller governments register higher ratings in this area. 
  
Legal System and 
Property Rights 
(LegalSystem) 
Measures the importance of the legal system as a determinant of economic freedom; countries where the 
rule of law prevails, protection of persons and their rightfully acquired property is guaranteed, the judiciary 
system is independent and unbiased and there is an effective and impartial enforcement of the law will score 
better in this area. 
  
Sound Money 
(SoundMoney) 
It focuses on the importance of money and relative price stability in the exchange process; sound money 
reduces transaction costs and facilitates exchange, thereby promoting economic freedom; so to score high 
in this area, a country must follow policies and adopt institutions that lead to low (and stable) rates of 
inflation and avoid regulations that limit the ability to use alternative currencies. 
  
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally 
(FreedomTrade) 
When governments impose restrictions that reduce the ability of their residents to engage in voluntary 
exchange with people in other countries, economic freedom is diminished; countries with low tariffs, easy 
clearance and efficient administration of customs, a freely convertible currency, and few controls on the 
movement of physical and human capital will score higher in this area. 
  
Regulation 
(Regulation) 
It measures how regulations restrict entry into markets and limit the freedom of exchange in credit, labour, 
and product markets; countries facing these regulatory constraints will score lower in this area. 
  
Source: See Gwartney et al. (2017). 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Correlation matrix 
         Correlations for total time period    
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1)EconFreedom 1 0.251 0.737 0.835 0.864 0.808 0.168 0.045 0.050 -0.042 -0.132 0.490 0.559 0.383 -0.371 0.657 
(2)SizeGov 0.164 1 -0.276 0.052 0.049 0.101 -0.067 -0.006 -0.005 -0.064 -0.023 -0.099 -0.376 0.105 0.062 -0.264 
(3)LegalSystem 0.781 -0.292 1 0.531 0.635 0.632 0.213 0.078 0.052 -0.005 -0.052 0.482 0.804 0.267 -0.376 0.735 
(4)SoundMoney 0.823 -0.032 0.546 1 0.730 0.564 0.124 0.018 0.050 -0.021 -0.107 0.420 0.446 0.211 -0.320 0.537 
(5)FreedomTrade 0.869 -0.010 0.667 0.733 1 0.620 0.147 0.042 0.044 -0.092 -0.143 0.498 0.535 0.377 -0.331 0.608 
(6)Regulation 0.796 -0.002 0.674 0.529 0.612 1 0.162 0.014 0.026 0.051 -0.114 0.395 0.480 0.409 -0.332 0.572 
(7)Right 0.249 -0.046 0.223 0.227 0.234 0.196 1 -0.224 0.030 -0.044 -0.063 0.231 0.236 -0.060 -0.076 0.177 
(8)Centre 0.124 0.004 0.110 0.110 0.113 0.073 -0.184 1 0.011 -0.026 0.027 0.127 0.071 0.045 -0.037 0.103 
(9)Elections 0.036 -0.022 0.038 0.043 0.035 0.020 0.030 0.014 1 -0.041 0.041 0.082 0.059 -0.021 -0.025 0.062 
(10)MajGov -0.008 -0.131 0.054 0.018 -0.074 0.096 -0.045 -0.037 -0.038 1 0.148 -0.160 -0.014 0.121 -0.003 -0.033 
(11)TimeOffice -0.183 -0.043 -0.073 -0.201 -0.213 -0.098 -0.121 -0.009 0.023 0.150 1 -0.372 -0.091 0.168 0.041 -0.224 
(12)Democracy 0.591 -0.047 0.475 0.535 0.609 0.432 0.291 0.145 0.059 -0.106 -0.451 1 0.499 -0.072 -0.254 0.465 
(13)LnGDPpc 0.674 -0.337 0.810 0.549 0.651 0.562 0.244 0.101 0.055 0.045 -0.111 0.471 1 0.211 -0.365 0.832 
(14)Trade 0.356 -0.004 0.314 0.180 0.371 0.395 -0.015 0.084 -0.018 0.124 0.245 -0.054 0.298 1 -0.107 0.213 
(15)FinCrisis -0.387 0.004 -0.344 -0.307 -0.347 -0.332 -0.076 -0.059 -0.030 0.016 0.097 -0.205 -0.352 -0.090 1 -0.385 
(16)Education 0.654 -0.265 0.745 0.529 0.610 0.576 0.193 0.131 0.063 -0.027 -0.219 0.457 0.846 0.226 -0.371 1 
    Correlations for 2000 onwards         
Notes: See Table 1. Upper-triangle (lower-triangle) shows the correlations for the entire sample period (for 2000 onwards). 
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Table A.3. Panel unit root tests 
  ADF Fisher-type tests 
Variable  P Z L* Pm 
2000 onwards      
EconFreedom  735.43 (0.000) -17.42 (0.000) -18.05 (0.000) 22.99 (0.000) 
  SizeGov  763.75 (0.000) -17.84 (0.000) -18.79 (0.000) 24.29 (0.000) 
  LegalSystem  720.14 (0.000) -17.18 (0.000) -17.63 (0.000) 22.28 (0.000) 
  SoundMoney  722.44 (0.000) -17.06 (0000) -17.63 (0.000) 22.39 (0.000) 
  FreedomTrade  703.99 (0.000) -16.51 (0.000) -16.98 (0.000) 21.54 (0.000) 
  Regulation  853.33 (0.000) -19.18 (0.000) -20.96 (0.000) 28.42 (0.000) 
      
Total time period      
EconFreedom  857.40 (0.000) -19.65 (0.000) -21.20 (0.000) 28.60 (0.000) 
  SizeGov  938.16 (0.000) -23.94 (0.000) -28.49 (0.000) 41.53 (0.000) 
  LegalSystem  960.91 (0.000) -21.46 (0.000) -23.98 (0.000) 33.37 (0.000) 
  SoundMoney  891.40 (0.000) -20.48 (0.000) -22.20 (0.000) 30.17 (0.000) 
  FreedomTrade  953.62 (0.000) -20.72 (0.000) -23.49 (0.000) 33.03 (0.000) 
  Regulation  981.07 (0.000) -22.99 (0.000) -26.96 (0.000) 38.90 (0.000) 
TimeOffice  872.28 (0.000) -19.96 (0.000) -23.41 (0.000) 33.61 (0.000) 
Democracy  593.69 (0.000) -11.69 (0.000) -14.06 (0.000) 19.29 (0.000) 
LnGDPpc  950.43 (0.000) -18.10 (0.000) -20.04 (0.000) 27.42 (0.000) 
Trade  935.31 (0.000) -18.24 (0.000) -20.02 (0.000) 26.97 (0.000) 
Education  825.75 (0.000) -14.79 (0.000) -17.03 (0.000) 24.45 (0.000) 
      
Notes: See Table 1. Four Fisher-type ADF unit-root test statistics are reported for the continuous variables only (the 
respective p-values are in parentheses): inverse chi-squared P; inverse normal Z; inverse logit L*; and the modified inverse 
chi-squared Pm. One lag of the series is used in the ADF regressions, but different lag structures produce similar results. 
Phillips-Perron unit-root tests were also considered, but the conclusions remain unchanged (those results are not reported 
here but are available upon request). These tests are preferred due to the fact of the panel is not strongly balanced. 
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Table A.4. Five-year time spans estimations (1975-2015) 
 EconFreedom GovSize LegalSystem SoundMoney Freed’Trade Regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
L.DepVar 0.4126*** 0.5017*** 0.4986*** 0.5534*** 0.4910*** 0.4937*** 0.5100*** 0.4687*** 
 (0.0829) (0.0702) (0.0698) (0.0848) (0.0726) (0.0680) (0.0699) (0.0888) 
Right 0.1213** 0.1123** 0.1947** 0.1067 -0.0317 0.1350* 0.1141* 0.1886** 
 (0.0608) (0.0569) (0.0910) (0.1109) (0.1227) (0.0813) (0.0690) (0.0828) 
Election 0.0964 0.0984 0.0910 0.0309 -0.0746 0.2310 0.1551 0.0447 
 (0.0642) (0.0803) (0.0774) (0.1837) (0.1381) (0.2234) (0.1579) (0.1061) 
MajGov -0.0252 -0.0578 -0.0487 -0.2041 -0.1164 -0.2125 0.0592 0.1802* 
 (0.0675) (0.0641) (0.0598) (0.1468) (0.1062) (0.1831) (0.1390) (0.0988) 
Democracy -0.0018 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0095*** -0.0005 0.0061** -0.0007 
 (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0069) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
LnGDPpc 0.0259 0.1198*** 0.0764* -0.2397*** 0.3997*** 0.1088 0.2273*** 0.1382*** 
 (0.0729) (0.0401) (0.0460) (0.0713) (0.0823) (0.0730) (0.0515) (0.0435) 
Trade 0.0015** 0.0017*** 0.0019** 0.0011 0.0016** 0.0016 0.0024*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
FinCrisis -0.3663*** -0.4063*** -0.3883*** -0.1771 -0.5013*** -1.1671*** -0.1697 -0.2469** 
 (0.0945) (0.0872) (0.0822) (0.1728) (0.1493) (0.2485) (0.1795) (0.1172) 
Education 1.2902***        
 (0.4427)        
OECD   0.1967*      
   (0.1112)      
OECD×Right   -0.1280      
   (0.1491)      
         
         
Observations 334 464 464 467 460 471 461 463 
Countries 104 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Instruments 85 87 89 87 87 87 87 87 
AR1 0.0092 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0077 0.0014 
AR2 0.4837 0.8435 0.9927 0.4742 0.2155 0.0695 0.1834 0.6509 
Hansen 0.3024 0.3990 0.3606 0.2995 0.2142 0.1588 0.2909 0.2411 
Diff-Hansen1 0.1002 0.4449 0.4274 0.3599 0.1592 0.1014 0.3693 0.1912 
Diff-Hansen2 0.9662 0.3398 0.2939 0.2834 0.5576 0.6076 0.2516 0.5319 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. L.DepVar corresponds to the lag of the dependent variable for the respective 
area of economic freedom. Time-effects are accounted for using year dummies (not reported here). Two-step system-GMM 
estimations using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (robust standard errors in parenthesis). Significance levels at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The lag of the dependent variable and Democracy are treated as 
endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the 
first-difference equation and their differences are used in the levels equation. As the number of time periods is much smaller, the 
same happens with the number of instruments so there is no need to collapse them. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the 
p-values of the Arellano-Bond tests for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. The 
Hansen test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity; Diff-Hansen1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments 
used in the level part (of the system) as a whole. Diff-Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the lagged level of economic freedom used 
as an instrument in the level part. 
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Table A.5. Averages over legislative periods (1975-2015) 
 EconFreedom GovSize LegalSystem SoundMoney Freed’Trade Regulation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
L.DepVar 0.1579** 0.1691** 0.1522*** 0.1547** 0.1646** 0.1041* 0.1528** 0.1970*** 
 (0.0711) (0.0660) (0.0571) (0.0722) (0.0767) (0.0568) (0.0638) (0.0517) 
Right 0.1398** 0.1279** 0.1402** 0.0128 0.0656 0.1401* 0.1112* 0.2303*** 
 (0.0554) (0.0508) (0.0583) (0.0836) (0.0829) (0.0730) (0.0627) (0.0693) 
Election 0.0462 0.0709 0.0801 0.2488 -0.0687 0.0717 0.0470 0.0058 
 (0.0810) (0.0575) (0.0614) (0.1858) (0.0615) (0.1038) (0.0669) (0.0622) 
MajGov -0.1166 -0.1066* -0.1043* -0.1215 -0.0114 -0.1836* -0.2212 -0.0305 
 (0.0768) (0.0577) (0.0602) (0.1020) (0.0993) (0.1016) (0.1826) (0.0769) 
Democracy 0.0075* 0.0079** 0.0076** 0.0042 0.0070* 0.0081 0.0166*** -0.0001 
 (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0065) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0052) 
LnGDPpc 0.1736** 0.2637*** 0.2384*** -0.3789*** 0.7791*** 0.4206*** 0.3513*** 0.2256*** 
 (0.0757) (0.0342) (0.0596) (0.0732) (0.1081) (0.0543) (0.0362) (0.0491) 
Trade 0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0026** 0.0016 0.0011 0.0013 0.0031*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
FinCrisis -0.3086** -0.3174*** -0.3116*** -0.2102** -0.1823*** -0.4499*** -0.3873*** -0.2638*** 
 (0.1422) (0.0586) (0.0571) (0.0913) (0.0666) (0.1416) (0.0716) (0.0700) 
Education 0.9458        
 (0.6814)        
OECD   0.1916*      
   (0.1139)      
OECD×Right   -0.0198      
   (0.1145)      
         
         
Observations 425 532 532 532 532 532 532 532 
Countries 104 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Instruments 84 88 90 88 88 88 88 88 
AR1 0.0065 0.0009 0.0009 0.0000 0.0002 0.0008 0.0004 0.0000 
AR2 0.6936 0.2729 0.3104 0.1239 0.7782 0.8974 0.5338 0.4608 
Hansen 0.4866 0.6367 0.6282 0.6914 0.8767 0.9026 0.9415 0.6192 
Diff-Hansen1 0.4909 0.4596 0.4580 0.8333 0.8836 0.6223 0.7854 0.3527 
Diff-Hansen2 0.4538 0.7430 0.7318 0.3251 0.6095 0.9634 0.9347 0.8428 
Notes: See Table 1 for the definition of the variables. A legislative period corresponds to the time during which there is no change 
in the government/cabinet. L.DepVar corresponds to the lag of the dependent variable for the respective area of economic freedom. 
Time-effects are accounted for using decade dummies (not reported here). Two-step system-GMM estimations using robust standard 
errors corrected for finite samples (robust standard errors in parenthesis). Significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The lag of the dependent variable and Democracy are treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; 
the respective lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation and their 
differences are used in the levels equation. As the number of time periods is much smaller, the same happens with the number of 
instruments so there is no need to collapse them. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values of the Arellano-Bond 
tests for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. The Hansen test reports the p-value for 
the null hypothesis of instrument validity; Diff-Hansen1 tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the level part (of the system) 
as a whole. Diff-Hansen 2 tests the exogeneity of the lagged level of economic freedom used as an instrument in the level part. 
 
 
